ABSTRACT The ever-increasing demand for vehicular traffic consumption in 5G makes the problem of spectrum scarcity in vehicular networks more serious. In order to solve this problem, cognitive radio (CR) technology has been used in vehicular networks, leading to cognitive vehicular networks (CVNs). However, different from traditional cognitive networks, the high mobility of CVNs makes cooperative spectrum sensing more challenging, and new attacks are frequently emerging. In this paper, we address a speed adjustment attack (SAA) on cooperative sensing in CVNs. In this attack, attackers can affect the spectrum sensing data of their neighbors by dynamically adjusting moving speed. Therefore, this attack can speed up the spread of error-sensing data across the entire network with changing neighbors. The simulation results show that the SAA can mislead the sensing result more quickly without detection. With Historical Data Information detection, it can significantly slow down the convergence time, potentially resulting in algorithmic divergence. 
I. INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of smart transportation [1] , [2] and driverless vehicular technology [3] , various vehicular wireless services and applications have gained great popularity from both academic and industrial areas. As the foundation of these services applications, vehicular networks attract more and more attentions. In vehicular networks, each vehicle is required to communicate with others for exchanging traffic information or road conditions. Since the bandwidth for communications among vehicles is limited [4] , the channel congestion problem [5] becomes more severe than ever due to the dramatic increase of vehicles, especially during the peak period of traffic accidents when vehicles use the same channel for communications [6] , [7] . This results in spectrum shortage problem, and the traffic information cannot be exchanged on time and hence safety hazards may occur.
To alleviate the spectrum shortage problem, cognitive radio (CR) technology has been introduced to vehicular networks which results in cognitive vehicular netThe associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Weisi Guo. works (CVNs) [8] - [10] . In CVNs, vehicles act as secondary users (SUs) and perform cooperative spectrum sensing [11] to find idle channels owned by primary users (PUs). In this way, SUs can access and communicate over these idle channels via dynamic spectrum access (DSA) policy [12] . Thus, the spectrum resources can be fully utilized and thereby the spectrum shortage problem can be alleviated. Different from traditional CR networks, vehicles in CVNs may move with high speed and thus it is hardly possible to implement a centralized fusion center to collect individual sensing results and obtain consensus on the spectrum availability of PUs. It is more effective to perform spectrum sensing in a distributed manner. Here, each vehicle can only exchange individual sensing results with their neighbors and the final results can be derived in an iterative fashion. In the following, we will use SUs and vehicles interchangeably.
However, there may exist malicious users who provide falsified sensing data when performing distributed cooperative spectrum sensing. This kind of common attack is called the Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification (SSDF) attack [13] , [14] . In this attack, attackers broadcast falsified sensing data to serve their different attack goals. We can divide the SSDF attacks into two categories, one is opposite SSDF attacks, and the other one is random SSDF attacks. With an opposite SSDF attack, attackers always send opposite results to neighbors during spectrum sensing i.e., report high sensing data value when the target PU is absent or report low sensing data value when the target PU is present. With a random SSDF attack, attackers send sensing data values randomly. In CVNs, selfish users want to hold channels as long as possible without violating the rules, and they always send high sensing data values to others when the target PU is absent. This belongs to opposite SSDF attacks. With respect to CVNs, vehicles can move quickly and only communicate with their neighbors. On the one hand, the mobility of vehicles can seriously affect the discovery of idle spectrum [15] . The efficiency of DSA in CVNs faces more challenges [16] . Some preliminary research works on cooperative sensing problems of this type have been conducted in [17] - [19] . On the other hand, there is also a great chance for malicious SUs to augment the influence of SSDF attacks in such a dynamic scenario. Here, an attacker's goal is to spread falsified data faster to mislead others or extend the convergence time without being detected. By moving at appropriate speeds, attackers can improve relative speed and achieve rapid changes of neighbors and relative uniform update message distribution. These make the distributed cooperative spectrum sensing much less effective in CVNs.
In CVNs, we also discover a new kind of SSDF attack. Instead of directly spreading falsified data to fixed neighbor nodes, an attacker can affect more users by changing neighbor nodes frequently. Thus in this paper, we mainly explore how attackers can efficiently perform SSDF attack by moving at appropriate speeds to maximize the attack success in distributed cooperative sensing. We first analyze the impact of mobility on distributed cooperative spectrum sensing algorithms in CVNs. Then we describe a Speed Adjustment Attack (SAA) in CVNs, and analyze the effect of this attack. Finally, we conclude this paper with some suggestions to deal with this kind of attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces distributed spectrum sensing and analysis. Section III presents the SAA on cooperative sensing in CVNs. Section IV discusses the simulation results and Section V concludes this paper.
II. SPECTRUM SENSING AND ANALYSIS

A. DISTRIBUTED COOPERATIVE SPECTRUM SENSING
The entities of a traditional distributed cognitive radio network (CRN) includes PUs and SUs. SUs can work independently to conduct spectrum sensing or cooperatively to make joint spectrum sensing decision. To obtain consistent spectrum sensing decision in distributed cooperative spectrum sensing, SUs need to interact with neighbor nodes, which may take multiple rounds of interactions. The system architecture is shown in Fig. 1 . PUs are fixed and SUs are fixed or moving with low velocity. With different kinds of detection technology, such as energy detection [20] , SUs can obtain sensing data and utilize distributed sensing algorithm to conduct cooperative spectrum sensing. Take SU i for example, the data updating process of distributed cooperative spectrum sensing algorithm (DCSSA) [21] - [26] is as follows:
where x i (k) is the updated sensing data of node SU i in the kth iteration. N SU i is the neighbor-set of node SU i , ε is a parameter that satisfies:
where the operator |.| means the cardinality of a set. For each secondary user SU i , the termination condition is,
Here is a constant. Assuming that when the iteration k equals to n, the data convergence process is terminated. Then we define the final convergence value x * of node SU i as follows:
The ultimate state of the sensed channel can be determined by each node SU i in the following way.
where λ c is the predefined threshold. If H = 0, the state of the channel is idle and SUs can utilize this channel. Otherwise, the channel is busy and used by PUs.
B. ANALYSIS OF DCSSA
DCSSA is widely used in distributed CRNs, but almost all research assumes that the networks are static or the neighbors of each node remain unchanged in the iteration process. However, in distributed CVNs, vehicles' mobility makes the topology of CVNs dynamic and neighbors are changing frequently. Mobility is a major challenge in CVNs, and many problems still need to be further studied [27] .
1) PERFORMANCE OF DCSSA IN CVNs
In the static network scenario, the neighbors of each node keep unchanged until the iterations finish when the sensing data of each node gradually converges. However, in dynamic CVNs, the variation of neighbor nodes may cause sensing data fluctuation during the iteration process. Therefore, in the dynamic network scenario, whether DCSSA can still work remains open. In this paper, we consider a distributed vehicular network architecture which is shown in Fig. 2 . For our case study, we assume there are 20 vehicles randomly distributed in four lanes in both directions and the vehicles form a connected network in the coverage of the target PU. With the data exchange among all SUs, more and more SUs' data aggregates into an interval. Besides, the fluctuation of each vehicle can also be seen in several iterations in Fig. 5 . The more the iterations, the less fluctuant the data. It indicates that the DCSSA in the dynamic situation has a good performance and it can directly be applied in dynamic CVNs.
2) SECURITY OF DCSSA
Due to the static network scenario, attackers are also immobile. SSDF attackers can only influence their neighbors in the VOLUME 7, 2019 iteration procedure. The altered sensing data spread slowly in the entire network. But if the attackers can move, they can affect more nodes and speed up the proliferation of erroneous data through purposeful mobility. Meanwhile, the mobility of attackers will increase the difficulty of detection by the detection mechanism existed. Therefore, the security problem of DCSSA will be more severe in CVNs.
III. SAA FORMULATION A. SYSTEM MODEL OF SAA
In this paper, the system model we consider is shown in Fig. 2 . There are two kinds of entities in the system, a PU and multiple SUs. The PU may be a station of a cellular network or a TV base station and SUs are CR vehicles which equipped with cognitive radio devices. The SUs, named as cognitive radio vehicles, use the energy detection method [28] to obtain sensing data. Then, SUs employ DCSSA with their neighbor nodes via the common control channel to conduct cooperative spectrum sensing with (1) and acquire final sensing decision with (5). The vehicles are distributed in several lanes in both directions. All vehicles can adjust speed within the limit range in the lane. The turning of vehicles is out of the scope of this paper. We also assume that all SUs are under the coverage of the PU during spectrum sensing process. The speed of the vehicles V i (t) and the width of lanes W l conform to the regulations of the relevant lanes in highway systems. In cooperative sensing, if a vehicle enters or leaves other vehicles' wireless signal coverage W s , we consider the neighbor nodes have changed. The newly joined neighbors continue to exchange sensing data until a sensing decision has reached.
B. ATTACK PROCESS OF SAA
The sensing data of SUs converges by interacting with their neighbors. In CVNs, the neighbors of each node may change with the mobility of vehicles. Attackers can adjust speed to change the neighbor sets of normal SUs frequently to affect more SUs. The details of the attack process are described as follows.
1) ATTACK MODEL
In the distributed vehicular network shown in Fig. 2 , all CR vehicles (A CR vehicle is defined to be a vehicle equipped with cognitive radio) can join cooperative spectrum sensing. A whole process of spectrum sensing contains two phases, a single node spectrum sensing phase and a data convergence phase. During the single node spectrum sensing phase, all nodes can sense the target channel and obtain the energy level from the PU. During the data convergence phase, all nodes will interact with their neighbor nodes to cooperate and get the final consistent convergence data. The data update phase is divided into multiple time slots and one time slot (or iteration) contains a data collection process and a data update process. Each node collects its neighbors' data and update its current data during data collection process and data update process, respectively. The process is shown in Fig. 6 . In this paper, we define two kinds of attackers with different demands as d m and d d , which are selfish and malicious, respectively. We define p i as the kind of attackers which is shown in (6)
where S SU is the set of selfish attackers that want to manipulate the sensing data for their own advantage, and M SU is the set of malicious attackers that want to purposefully interfere with the cooperative sensing. S Att = S SU ∪ M SU , i.e., S Att is the whole set of attackers that contains S SU and M SU . Since each SU can only broadcast one sensing value to its neighbors at one time, we assume an attacker can be either a selfish SU or a malicious SU, but not both at the same time. In other words, in time t, the following relationship is assumed:
If an attacker may want to communicate over the target channel and make other SUs decide that this channel is occupied by a PU, they will set p = d m . This SU behave selfishly, attempting to monopolize the target channel for its own use. If an attackers is malicious and its purpose is to interfere with communications of SUs or PUs, it will set p = d d . We assume that attackers can obtain other conspiratorial attackers' identities and demands via a dedicated channel. After confirming their demands, attackers can collude to share attack information. Besides, all attackers can detect the states of primary users. Then, attackers determine the kind based on their demands mentioned above. The value D s updated by SU i that will be interacted with neighbors is shown in (8):
indicates that the attackers are sending the sensing value that is greater than the threshold λ c to their neighbors all the time when the sensed channel is idle, and this can make the final convergence value greater than λ c . Then, the honest SUs will decide the channel is being used by the PU, making the attackers reuse the channel exclusively. Similarly, when D s (i) = D random , attackers will send sensed data randomly. The value of D random can be selected from (9) .
where D low < λ, and the variable r is a random number that is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Malicious attackers choose which sensing data to send based on the value of the random number r. The case of D n means the attackers update their sensed data according to DCSSA normally. In this case, the attackers are malicious and their purpose is to obstruct the process of DCSSA, resulting in a waste of spectrum resources and energy consumption of SUs.
2) SPEED ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM
We assume that the vehicle distribution obeys the Poisson distribution with parameter λ, which is shown in (10) .
where λt is the average number of vehicles arriving within a count interval of length t. Attackers can constantly change their neighbor nodes by changing their relative speed. Therefore, attackers' neighbor-sets are changing frequently in different data collection process. Thus, the sensed data from attackers can affect more secondary users or vehicles. We define the arrival rate of an attacker's neighbor node within an interval of interest as λ , then λ t is the number of the attacker's neighbors where t is the length of the data collection process. The greater the relative speed of the attacker to the normal secondary users, the greater the parameter λ . Attackers increase λ by increasing the relative speed to expand the neighbor node sets. Attackers can launch the SAA in the following way.
Once the conspiratory attackers estimate the demands p i , they will collude with each other and broadcast sensing data D s (i) to their neighbors. The details of collusion are as follows:
All attackers need to initialize the speed V 0 first. The V 0 is:
where V min and V max are the minimum and maximum speed limits for the lane where the vehicles are located, respectively. In this way, attackers can obtain the maximum speed difference, then increase the rate of change of their neighbor-node sets with speed adjustment. So far, the attackers have completed the initialization of the relevant parameters, and they start cooperative sensing with their neighbors by using DCSSA. Take an attacker SU a (SU a ∈ S Att ) for an example. SU a sends altered sensed data to neighbors according to its demand and does not update sensed data with DCSSA or updates sensed data abnormally. Then, SU a can get its neighbor set N a , and adjust speed according to N a when the number of iterations k ≥ 2. The speed adjustment method is expressed in (12) , and the speed adjustment algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
where V a (t) is the speed of attacker SU a at time t, and N a (t) is the neighbor set of attacker SU a at time t. Parameter a is the speed change scalar from set {a 1 , a 2 }. Parameter a 1 and a 2 indicate acceleration and deceleration, respectively, and the absolute values of them are different. The specific choice for a 1 and a 2 are described in Algorithm 1. Parameter b is a speed change scalar uniformly distributed in
The directions of a and b are related to the vehicular moving direction. It indicates that the value of
δ is a positive integer. Then, the attacker SU a will update its neighbor set N a (t) before each iteration, and continue to launch cooperative spectrum sensing based on its demand p a . The condition that IN =|S Att ∩ N a | ≤ δ indicates that each attack attempts to achieve ''Relative uniform distribution'' which is one kind of distributions that satisfies the following two conditions, 1) For each attacker SU i , the number of attackers in its neighbor set is smaller than δ. 2) There exist one or more normal SUs in the neighbor set of each attacker. That is ∀SU i ∈ S Att , N SU i S Att ≤ δ, and ∃SU k , SU k ∈ N SU i , and
| is the cardinality of the set. δ is an integer greater than or equal to 0, N SU i is the neighbor set of SU i , S Att is the set of attackers. Q is the total number of collusion attackers, and K is the total number of normal SUs. Generally, the larger the N SU i , the faster the data spread. When δ = 0, the distribution of attackers can reach ''Strict relative uniform distribution'' and it refers to that there are no collusive attackers in each attacker's neighbor set. This implies that the erroneous data of each attacker is sent to normal secondary users, and this data will work during attack process. In other words, attackers will not send spectrum sensed data to other collusive attackers, therefore, attackers can maximize the impact of data diffusion efficiently.
Algorithm 1 Speed Adjustment Algorithm
if N a (t) = N a (t − 1) then 4: if V i (t) + a 1 > V max then 5:
end if 7: if V i (t) + a 2 < V min then 8:
end if 10: end if 11: if N a (t) = N a (t − 1), and IN ≤ δ then 12 :
end if 14: if N a (t) = N a (t − 1), and IN > δ then 15 :
end if 17: end while We define a diffusivity T i for SU i to describe the diffusion of data, defined in (13) . K is the number of iterations. A SU is the set of all SUs. N i (k) is the neighbor set of SU i in iteration k.
The average diffusivity of N T secondary users or vehicles (1 ≤ N T ≤ |A SU |) T N T is defined as follows,
In general, the greater the arrival rate λ, the greater the average diffusivity T N T . For attackers, the greater the λ , the greater the relative speed, the more neighbors of attackers in each iteration, and the broader the impact of the attack data.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS OF SPEED ADJUSTMENT ATTACK
The speed adjustment algorithm is effective in the following two aspects. On one hand, it is energy efficient with collusion attack by relative uniformity distribution. On the other hand, the proposed algorithm can reduce the risk of attackers to be detected effectively by frequent change of attackers' neighbor sets. The simulation parameters are shown in TABLE 1. In order to illustrate the proposed speed adjustment attack mentioned above, we consider that there are 5 attackers randomly distributing in four lanes in both directions, and attackers launch the SSDF attack with selfish and malicious types mentioned in Section III. Attackers can obtain initial speed from (11) , and adapt their speed according to neighbor sets on the basis of (12).
A. DATA CONVERGENCE TIME OF SPEED ADJUSTMENT ATTACK
When attackers need to monopolize channels for communication, their purposes are to converge the sensing data to a value which is larger than the threshold λ c as fast as possible. Therefore, other SUs will consider that the target channels are busy (occupied by PUs). For this purpose, attackers will speed up the spread of false-sense data globally and improve attack efficiency by adjusting their location and speed. Therefore, the attackers will try their best to seek the ''Relative uniformity distribution'' defined in section III. We first consider the situation that there is no attack detection scheme or the attack detection scheme is invalid. In this case, the ''Relative uniformity distribution'' makes the attack more efficient and the simulation results are shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 .
In the simulation, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 have the same initial topology distribution. The same initial topology means that each identical node has the same initial neighbor node-set. The initial topology distribution of the network is shown in TABLE 2. Fig. 7 is the static situation and there is no change of neighbors during the convergency process. The attackers' erroneous data can only affect fixed neighbor nodes directly. Fig. 8 is the dynamic situation of CVNs, in which secondary users are mobile and their neighbors may change from time to time. The attackers' erroneous data can directly affect more nodes. In the static situation, the neighbor node-set of attackers is fixed because attackers can't adjust their neighbors. The attackers' erroneous data can only slowly spread to the entire network through data interaction between nodes. From  Fig. 7 , we can obtain that it needs more than 100 iterations and the attack is not efficient because the distribution of attackers is fixed and not the ''Relative uniformity distribution''. Unlike the static situation, attackers in CVNs can change their neighbors by moving according to (12) . From Fig. 8 we can see that it only needs less than 70 iterations and this SAA is more efficient. The attackers can quickly achieve the purpose of their attack by seeking for the tendency of ''Relative uniformity distribution''. Fig. 9 shows the trend of the process of ''Relative uniformity distribution'', and we can see that the attackers' distribution gradually tends to ''Relative uniformity distribution'' based on speed adjustment.
According to (13) and (14), we have conducted several experiments to compute the average diffusivity T N T . We set N T =|S Att | = 5. For the 5 malicious vehicles, we first compute the average diffusivity T h N T when they don't Equation (15) and (16) are computed with the same initial topology, and vehicles can change their neighbor nodes by adjusting speed. From (15) and (16) , and this also proves that the proposed speed adjustment algorithm can speed up the data diffusion. The result is consistent with Fig. 8. Fig. 10 is an illustration of how VOLUME 7, 2019 the proposed SAA can speed up the spread of error-sensing data.
In Fig. 10 , we take node k as an example for illustration. Node k has an honest neighbor node i, and node n is an attacker. Node i is a one-hop direct neighbor node of node n. Assume that the number of neighbor nodes of node k at time t is N h k(t). At the same time, due to the average weighting data of each neighbor node, it can be approximated that each neighbor node contributes to node k data as 1 N h k(t) , and other nodes make the same assumption. Based on the above assumptions, in the (a) state of Fig. 10 , the influence of the attacker node n on the node k data can be approximated as:
is the number of neighbor nodes of node i at time t. Then, the attacker node n performs speed adjustment through the proposed SAA algorithm, the network changes to status (b) of Fig. 10 . In the (b) state of Fig. 10 , the influence of the attacker node n on the node k data can be approximated as:
, and n is the amount of variations in neighbor nodes. In the experimental statistics, the value of n is smaller than N h k(t), and its influence can be neglected. Therefore, in most cases, it is satisfied: This result shows that the proposed SAA can expand the influence of the attackers error-sensing data, thus speeding up the spread of error-sensing data efficiently. It should be noted that due to the dynamic network environment, strict mathematical proofs are generally not available. The above analysis is for most situations that exist. There may be individual cases where the above conditions are not satisfied. However, the overall trend of attackers is to change in speeding up the spread of error-sensing data.
B. DATA CONVERGENCE TREND OF SAA DATA
Most of studies on SSDF attack detection schemes in static situation require Historical Data Information HDI) of neighbor nodes. Then, each node can analyze behaviors of their neighbors through historical sensing data to determine whether the neighbors are malicious attackers or not. The SSDF attack detection schemes that need historical data mainly include convergence trend analysis [29] , hash of data updating process [30] , and trust mechanism [31] - [33] . After data accumulation, the detection schemes mentioned above can start attack detection and eliminate malicious data. It means that the effect of attackers' wrong data only work in the data accumulation phase. But in the dynamic CVNs, the neighbor nodes will change over time. Once a new neighbor joins, the node will use the data of the new neighbor unconditionally. Therefore, the impact of incorrect data will be further expanded, especially in the situation that attackers make rapid changes to neighbor nodes through speed adjustment. In consequence, it is more difficult to detect SSDF attackers.
The detection performances of schemes with data accumulation in CVNs are shown in Fig. 11 and Fig. 12. In Fig. 11 , five attackers conspire to send sensing data lager than the decision threshold λ c when they detected the channel is idle. We take node 2 as the representative node in the five attackers and others are honest nodes. In Fig. 12 , both selfish (node 1) and malicious (node 13) attackers are considered. In Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 , the fluctuations in the curves of honest nodes indicate the changes of neighbor nodes and the convergence process. From Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 , we can see that the curves can't converge even if the iteration increased to 250. This will result in the waste of available resources, the consumption of legitimate users' energy, or even interfere with PUs' normal communications. The Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 also indicates that it's more difficult to detect the SAA with traditional detection methods.
Without loss of generality, the proposed SAA can also extended to the scenario of multiple primary users. Before the speed initialization process, attackers should decide who to work with. The attackers with the same target channel will cooperate and follow the attack process of the SAA proposed in this paper.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first described the challenges of spectrum sensing, and analyzed the security problem in dynamic CVNs. Then, the Speed Adjustment Attack was proposed for distributed CVNs. The obtained results verified that the proposed SAA can speed up the spread of error-sensing data efficiently and increase detection difficulty. The proposed SAA in this paper is for the highway scene, and the speed adjustment meets the requirements of the highway speed (the highway speed requirements of each country are different). For more complex traffic scenarios and more restriction of road and traffic environment like urban areas, the mobile SSDF attack method needs to be further studied.
The characters of SAA are that attackers try to seek the ''Relative uniformity distribution'', and to evade data accumulation detection schemes by rapidly changing neighborsets. To defend this attack in CVNs, some methods which are independent of the knowledge of history data can be taken into consideration.
